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ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the court of appeals 
determined that Utah's comparative negligence scheme effectively abolished the open 
and obvious danger rule as a complete defense in landowner negligence actions. In 
House v. Armour of America, Inc., 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996), this Court clarified Utah's 
supposed abandonment of the open and obvious danger rule and concluded that it may be 
applied in certain circumstances to absolve a defendant from liability. The question 
presented in this case is: 
Whether the court of appeals correctly concluded that House overruled Donahue 
such that a landowner is relieved from a duty of care to protect an invitee from an open 
and obvious danger where the landowner should not expect the invitee to encounter the 
danger without protecting himself or to otherwise become distracted from the danger. 
"On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the court of 
appeals, not that of the district court, and applies the same standard of review used by the 
court of appeals." Hutchings v. State. 2003 UT 52; P.3d 1150 (Utah 2003). A grant of 
summary judgment is reviewed for correctness. See Baczuk v. Salt Lake Regional Med. 
Q L , 2000 UT App 225, Tf5, 8 P.3d 1037. 
DECISION BELOW 
The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 2003 UT App 240, 477 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 8. (App. A.) 
1 
JURISDICTION 
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on July 10, 2003. The petition 
for a writ of certiorari was filed on August 11, 2003. The Supreme Court granted the 
petition on October 29, 2003. 74 P.3d 987(Table) (Utah 2003). The jurisdiction of the 
Utah Supreme Court is invoked under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2a-4. 
CONTROLLING LEGISLATION 
There are no provisions of constitutions, statutes, ordinances, or regulations of 
central importance to this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A, Nature of the Case, 
This case involves landowner liability to an invitee who is injured as a result of an 
open and obvious danger existing on the land. Specifically, this case considers whether 
the open and obvious danger rule may relieve a landowner from any duty to the invitee 
where the open and obvious danger existed prior to the invitee's entry and the landowner 
should not expect the invitee to encounter the danger without protecting himself or to 
otherwise become distracted from the danger. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
Respondent contracted with Petitioner, a professional painter, to paint the interior 
of Respondent's home while the home was under construction. Petitioner was injured in 
the course of painting the home. The injury was the result of Petitioner encountering an 
open and obvious danger—an unprotected balcony—on the construction site. 
2 
Petitioner filed suit against Respondent in the Fifth District Court for Washington 
County. Respondent moved for summary judgment, arguing that he had no duty to 
Petitioner and therefore could not be held liable for Petitioner's injuries. The district 
court granted the motion and entered judgment for Respondent. 
Petitioner appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, which transferred jurisdiction of 
the appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district 
court's decision. 
Petitioner now petitions this Court to review the court of appeals' decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1996, Defendant/Respondent Kurt Beckstead ("Beckstead") undertook 
construction of a home located in Santa Clara, Utah. (R. 75.) The home was to be the 
primary residence for Beckstead and his family. (R. 75.) Beckstead acted as his own 
general contractor in the construction of his home. (R. 75, 101.) 
Beckstead hired Plaintiff/Petitioner John Hale ("Hale") to paint the interior of the 
home. (R. 101). While Beckstead bought the paint and generally told Hale how the paint 
should look, Beckstead did not control the manner in which Hale was to paint the home. 
(R. 101.) 
Hale entered Beckstead's home solely for the purpose of painting it. (R. 101.) 
Because the home was under construction, the guardrails that would normally be in place 
were not yet installed on the second floor balcony of the home. (R. 101.) Any danger 
posed by the missing guardrails was open and obvious. (R. 102.) While inside the home 
and in the course of performing his work, despite the open and obvious nature of the 
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danger posed by the exposed balcony, Hale stepped off the balcony and fell to the first 
level of the home. (R. 101.) 
On March 21, 2000, Hale filed a complaint against Beckstead in the Fifth District 
Court for Washington County, alleging, inter alia, negligence and premises liability. (R. 
1-6.) 
Beckstead moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Hale was an 
independent contractor who controlled his own manner and method of performance and 
therefore, under Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 979 P.2d 322, he owed no duty to Hale, 
thereby precluding any recovery under a theory of negligence. (R. 58, 63.) 
The district court granted the motion and entered summary judgment for 
Beckstead. See Hale, 2003 UT App 240 at f7. The district court found that Hale "fell 
while on [Beckstead's] premises as a business visitor or invitee, that [Beckstead] did not 
control or direct the manner of [Hale's] work, and that any danger posed to [Hale] by the 
condition of [Beckstead's] partially completed home was open and obvious to [Hale]." 
(R. 101.) Thus, the district court held that "[Beckstead] had no duty of care towards 
[Hale] concerning the manner or method of [Hale's] work performance and the condition 
of [Beckstead's] property was not such that [Beckstead] would be subject to liability to 
[Hale]. . ." (R. 102.) 
Hale appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals. See Hale, 2003 UT App 240 at f7. 
The court of appeals affirmed. See id. at %l. Applying the approach of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts to landowner liability as set forth in sections 343 and 343 A, the court 
of appeals held that Beckstead was relieved of any duty to Hale. See id. at [^24. The 
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court concluded that the open and obvious danger rule, as set forth in section 343 A, was 
determinative, and that no exception to the rule applied to impose a duty on Beckstead. 
See id. 
Judge Thome dissented. In Judge Thome's opinion, the majority's decision was at 
odds with Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), see id. at |26 
(Thome, J., dissenting), wherein the court of appeals abolished the open and obvious 
danger rule as incompatible with Utah's comparative negligence system. See Donahue, 
780 P.2d at 1278; see also Hale, 2003 UT App 240 at f 9 n. 1. Judge Thome opined that, 
under the doctrine of stare decisis, the court of appeals must adhere to Donahue. See 
Hale, 2003 UT App 240 at fflf26-27 (Thome, J., dissenting). 
The majority responded to Judge Thome's dissent by noting that this Court, in 
House v. Armour of America, Inc., 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996), overruled Donahue sub 
silento,l by clarifying that the open and obvious danger rule may in fact, depending upon 
the circumstances of the case, act as a complete bar to liability. See id. at fflf9 n.l, 15 n.3. 
Hale now petitions this Court to review the court of appeals' decision. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The decision of the court of appeals is correct and follows this Court's precedents. 
The sweeping abolition of the open and obvious danger rule in Donahue v. Durfee, 780 
P.2d 1275 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) has been overruled. 
It is worth noting that Judge Orme wrote the opinion for the court of appeals in Donahue and 
was also a member of the panel majority in Hale. 
< 
In Donahue, the court of appeals held that the Utah Legislature's adoption of a 
comparative negligence system "by necessary implication abolished the open and 
obvious danger rule as an absolute bar to an injured guest's recovery." 780 P.2d at 1279. 
The court also concluded that Utah necessarily abandoned the approach of section 343 A 
of the Restatement, which, the court stated, provides that a "landowner is not liable for a 
guest's injuries resulting from an open and obvious danger unless the ktndowner 'should 
anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.'" Id at 1278. 
However, four years later, this Court, in English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 
1993), applied sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement to hold that a defendant 
landowner did not owe a duty of care to an injured invitee. See id. at 156. This Court 
reasoned that under sections 343 and 343 A, a landowner has a duty to warn an invitee 
about two general types of hazards: "(1) those that are present on the land when the 
invitee enters which the possessor should expect the invitee will not discover or realize, 
and (2) those that the possessor creates after the invitee's entry[.]" Id. 
In Laws v. Blanding City. 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah Ct App. 1995), the court of 
appeals found a landowner, Blanding City, liable for injuries suffered by an invitee as a 
result of an open and obvious danger existing on the city's land. In Laws, consistent with 
English, the court held that the correct statement of a landowner's duty to an invitee "is 
contained in sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement." IdL at 1085. 
Addressing the open and obvious danger doctrine, the court determined that the 
city was not relieved from a duty of care to its invitees because the defendant was a 
municipality and the plaintiff invitee was required by ordinance to "encounter" the open 
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and obvious danger. See id. at 1086. Thus, the court concluded that the city should have 
known a reasonable person would encounter the danger. See id. 
In House v. Armour of America, Inc., 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996), this Court 
reviewed a court of appeals' decision involving a products liability action. In its 
decision, the court of appeals addressed an assertion from the defendant that it owed no 
duty to warn the plaintiff of the open and obvious danger existent in a product. See 
House v. Armour of Am., Inc.. 886 P.2d 542, 548 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), aff*d, 929 P.2d 
340 (Utah 1996). The court of appeals rejected this assertion concluding that Donahue 
abandoned the open and obvious danger rule as a complete defense in a negligence 
action. See id. 
Although it ultimately affirmed the court of appeals, this Court took issue with the 
court of appeals' conclusion that Utah had abandoned the open and obvious danger rule 
as a complete defense in a negligence action. See House, 929 P.2d at 344. This Court 
determined that, in certain circumstances, the open and obvious danger rule could 
completely absolve a defendant from liability. See id. 
As a result of these decisions, Donahue's sweeping proposition concerning the 
abandonment of section 343 A and the open and obvious danger rule as a complete 
defense had been overturned by this Court. 
In Hale, the court of appeals correctly concluded that Donahue was no longer 
viable and appropriately applied these two principles in finding Beckstead owed no duty 
of care to Hale. Consistent with sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement, the court of 
appeals framed the dispositive issue in Hale as: "whether or not Beckstead should have 
anticipated that Hale would suffer injury despite the known and obvious danger posed by 
the unprotected balcony, either because Hale's interior painting required a deliberate 
encounter with the danger, or because Hale was likely to become distracted." Hale, 2003 
UTApp240atTfl6. 
The court of appeals ultimately and correctly concluded: "Beckstead should not 
have expected that Hale would necessarily encounter the unprotected balcony, or that his 
attention would be distracted from it. Accordingly, we hold that Beckstead was relieved 
of any duty to Hale. Hence, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment." 
IdLat1}24. 
ARGUMENT 
Hale asks this Court to address the issue raised by Judge Thorne in dissent, that the 
majority's opinion in Hale is at odds with Donahue and therefore requires clarification 
from this Court. However, as set forth below, the decision of the court of appeals is 
correct, is consistent with and follows this Court's precedents. 
In Donahue v. Durfee, the court of appeals held that the Utah Legislature's 
adoption of a comparative negligence system "by necessary implication abolished the 
open and obvious danger rule as an absolute bar to an injured guest's recovery." 780 
P.2d at 1279. In so holding, the court also concluded that Utah necessarily abandoned the 
approach of section 343 A of the Restatement, which, the court stated, provides that a 
"landowner is not liable for a guest's injuries resulting from an open and obvious danger 
unless the landowner 'should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or 
obviousness.'" Id. at 1278. 
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However, four years later, this Court, in English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 
1993), applied sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement to hold that a defendant 
landowner did not owe a duty of care to an injured invitee. See id. at 156. This Court 
reasoned that under sections 343 and 343 A, a landowner has a duty to warn an invitee 
about two general types of hazards: "(1) those that are present on the land when the 
invitee enters which the possessor should expect the invitee will not discover or realize, 
and (2) those that the possessor creates after the invitee's entry[.]" Id This Court found 
neither present in English. See id. Thus, with English, Donahue's foundation begins to 
erode. 
Conspicuously absent from Hale's brief is any effort to distinguish this Court's 
unequivocal reliance on sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement in English. See, 
generally. Petitioner's brief. 
Thereafter, in Laws v. Blanding City, 893 P.2d 1083 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the 
court of appeals found a landowner, Blanding City, liable for injuries suffered by an 
invitee as a result of an open and obvious danger existing on the city's land. In Laws, 
consistent with English, the court held that the correct statement of a landowner's duty to 
an invitee "is contained in sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement." Id, at 1085. 
Addressing the open and obvious danger doctrine, the court determined that the 
city was not relieved from a duty of care to its invitees because the defendant was a 
municipality and the plaintiff invitee was required by ordinance to "encounter" the open 
and obvious danger. See id. at 1086. Thus, the court concluded that the city should have 
known a reasonable person would encounter the danger. See id. 
Subsequently, in House v. Armour of America, Inc., 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996), 
this Court reviewed a court of appeals' decision involving a products liability action. In 
its decision, the court of appeals addressed an assertion from the defendant that it owed 
no duty to warn the plaintiff of the open and obvious danger existent in a product. See 
House v. Armour of Am.. Inc.. 886 P.2d 542, 548 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), affd, 929 P.2d 
340 (Utah 1996). The court of appeals rejected this assertion concluding that Donahue 
abandoned the open and obvious danger rule as a complete defense in a negligence 
action. See id. 
Although it ultimately affirmed the court of appeals, this Court took issue with the 
court of appeals' conclusion that Utah had abandoned the open and obvious danger rule 
as a complete defense in a negligence action. See House, 929 P.2d at 344. This Court 
determined that, in certain circumstances, the open and obvious danger rule could 
completely absolve a defendant from liability. See id. 
Thus, by the time Hale v. Beckstead found its way to the court of appeals, two 
principles had been firmly established: (1) sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement 
provide the standard in determining the duty of care a landowner owes an invitee and (2), 
in certain circumstances, the open and obvious danger rule could completely absolve a 
defendant from liability. As a result, Donahue's sweeping proposition concerning the 
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abandonment of section 343 A2 and the open and obvious danger rule as a complete 
defense had effectively been washed away by this Court. 
In Hale, the court of appeals correctly concluded that Donahue was no longer 
viable and appropriately applied these two principles in finding Beckstead owed no duty 
of care to Hale. Consistent with sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement, the court of 
appeals framed the dispositive issue in Hale as: "whether or not Beckstead should have 
anticipated that Hale would suffer injury despite the known and obvious danger posed by 
the unprotected balcony, either because Hale's interior painting required a deliberate 
encounter with the danger, or because Hale was likely to become distracted." Hale, 2003 
UTApp240atK16. 
With regard to the deliberate encounter exception, the court of appeals determined 
that, unlike the plaintiff invitee in Laws, "Hale was under no obligation by city ordinance 
or otherwise to encounter Beckstead's land at all, let alone the unprotected balcony[.]" 
Id at Tf 18. Rather, Hale entered Beckstead's land "to perform a freely negotiated painting 
contract for which he had expertise." Id. 
The court further reasoned that Beckstead could reasonably expect Hale, an 
experienced painter, to take the necessary safety precautions to protect himself and had 
no reason to believe that Hale would encounter the unprotected balcony without taking 
such safety precautions. See id. at f 20. As a result, unlike the city in Laws, Beckstead 
2
 Section 343 A, adopted by this Court in English and applied by the court of appeals in Laws, 
expressly and specifically addresses the open and obvious danger rule. Thus, it would be error to 
conclude that Donahue had any continuing viability even before House. 
1 1 
had no reason to expect Hale would deliberately encounter the known or obvious danger 
and Hale presented no evidence to the trial court to show otherwise. See id. at J^20, n.4. 
With regard to the Restatement's distraction exception, the court of appeals 
reasoned that it did not apply to distractions that are typical of any construction site. See 
id at f22 (citing Kotecki v. Walsh Constr. Co.. 776 N.E.2d 774, 780 (111. App. Ct. 2002) 
(refusing to extend distraction exception for painter injured on construction site where no 
unusual distraction occurred)). Rather, the distraction must be an unusual one. See id. 
(citing Kotecki, 776 N.E.2d at 780). The court then noted that Hale did not put forth 
evidence to show that any unusual distraction existed in Beckstead's home at the time 
Hale was painting the same. See id. at ^23 n.5. 
Thus, the court of appeals ultimately and correctly concluded: "Beckstead should 
not have expected that Hale would necessarily encounter the unprotected balcony, or that 
his attention would be distracted from it. Accordingly, we hold that Beckstead was 
relieved of any duty to Hale. Hence, we affirm the district court's grant of summary 
judgment." I4at^24. 
In sum, the court of appeals' decision in Hale v. Beckstead is consistent with and 
follows this Court's application of the open and obvious danger rule in English. 
CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals correct ruled that the open and obvious danger rule as 
articulated in English is controlling precedent in this case. The court of appeals was 
correct in affirming summary judgment in favor of Beckstead. The court of appeals 
decision should be affirmed. 
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Respectfully submitted this JJj^day of May, 2004. 
BRINDLEY SULLIVAN 
kz. Brent M. Brindley 
Attorneys for Respondent Kurt Beckstead 
1 ^ 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
John D. HALE, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Kurt BECKSTEAD and John Does I through V, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 20020196-CA. 
July 10, 2003. 
Painter, who was injured when he inadvertently 
stepped off the second-floor balcony and fell to the 
first floor below, brought action against general 
contractor, alleging negligence, violation of the 
Occupational and Safety Health Act (OSHA), and 
premises liability. The Fifth District Court, St. 
George Department, G. Rand Beacham, J., entered 
summary judgment for general contractor, and 
painter appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, 
Associate P.J., held that general contractor did not 
owe painter any duty. 
Affirmed. 
Thorne, J., filed dissenting opinion. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Judgment €==>185(2) 
228kl85(2) Most Cited Cases 
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, 
appellate court evaluates the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from that 
evidence in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment. 
[2] Appeal and Error €=^863 
30k863 Most Cited Cases 
Because the determination of whether summary 
judgment is appropriate presents a question of law, 
appellate court accords no deference to the trial 
court's decision and instead reviews it for 
correctness. 
[3] Appeal and Error €^>842(4) 
30k842(4) Most Cited Cases 
The issue of whether a duty exists in negligence 
action is a question of law which appellate court 
reviews for correctness. 
[4] Negligence €^1205(7) 
272kl205(7) Most Cited Cases 
[4] Negligence €^>1286(7) 
272kl286(7) Most Cited Cases 
Open and obvious danger rule was the applicable 
law with respect to negligence action brought 
against general contractor by painter, who was 
injured when he inadvertently stepped off the 
second-floor balcony and fell to the first floor 
below. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 343, 343A 
[5] Negligence €=>1205(7) 
272kl205(7) Most Cited Cases 
[5] Negligence €=>1296 
272kl296 Most Cited Cases 
The danger, namely second-floor balcony which 
lacked railings because construction at house was 
not yet completed, was known or obvious to painter, 
who was injured when he inadvertently stepped off 
the second-floor balcony and fell to the first floor 
below, with respect to painter's negligence action 
against general contractor; the inherent risk of such 
a condition in a partially-constructed house was 
apparent to and would be recognized by a 
reasonable man in painter's position as an 
experienced painting subcontractor exercising 
ordinary perception, intelligence, and judgment. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 A. 
[6J Negligence €=^1205(7) 
272kl205(7) Most Cited Cases 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
r a g e 3 01y 
74 P.3d 628 
477 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 2003 UT App 240 
(Cite as: 74 P3d 628) 
Deliberate encounter exception to the open and 
obvious danger rule was not applicable with respect 
to negligence action brought against general 
contractor by painter, who was injured when he 
inadvertently stepped off second-floor balcony and 
fell to the first floor below; painter was under no 
obligation by city ordinance or otherwise to 
encounter general contractor's land at all, let alone 
the unprotected balcony from which he fell, and 
instead, painter voluntarily entered land to perform 
freely negotiated painting contract for which he had 
expertise, and contractor could reasonably expect 
that painter would take necessary safety 
precautions. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 A. 
[7] Negligence €=^1205(7) 
272kl205(7) Most Cited Cases 
Distraction exception to the open and obvious 
danger rule was not applicable with respect to 
negligence action brought against general contractor 
by painter, who was injured when he inadvertently 
stepped off second-floor balcony and fell to the first 
floor below; contractor did not have a duty to 
anticipate and mitigate against ordinary distractions 
which might cause painter harm from known and 
obvious dangers on construction site. Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 343 A. 
[8] Negligence €=^1205(7) 
272kl205(7) Most Cited Cases 
General contractor did not owe painter any duty to 
painter, who was injured when he inadvertently 
stepped off the second-floor balcony and fell to the 
first floor below; painter contracted with general 
contractor to paint the interior of general 
contractor's house while construction was ongoing, 
painter stepped off an unprotected balcony area that 
was known and obvious to him, and general 
contractor should not have expected that painter 
would necessarily encounter the unprotected 
balcony, or that his attention would be distracted 
from it. 
*629 Aaron J. Prisbrey, St. George, for Appellant. 
Bryan J. Pattison and Brent M. Brindley, Durham, 
Jones & Pinegar, St. George, for Appellees. 
Before BILLINGS, Associate P.J., and ORME, and 
THORNE, Judges. 
Copr. © West 2004 No ( 
Page 2 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
U 1 John Hale appeals the district court's grant of 
summary judgment to Kurt Beckstead. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
[1] U 2 "When reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, we evaluate the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from that 
evidence in a light most favorable to the party 
opposing summary judgment." Fishbaugh v. Utah 
Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1998) 
(quotations and citation omitted). Accordingly, we 
recite the facts as presented by Hale, although there 
is no real dispute as to the facts. 
\ 3 In 1996, Beckstead began construction of a 
house on land he owned in Santa Clara, Utah. The 
house was to be the primary residence for 
Beckstead and his family. Beckstead acted as his 
own general contractor in the construction of the 
house. 
\ 4 Beckstead hired Hale to paint the interior of 
the house. Beckstead did not exercise control over 
the day-to-day performance of the painting. In fact, 
at the time Halefs injuries occurred, Beckstead was 
out of town. 
\ 5 The house was under construction when Hale 
performed the painting work. Accordingly, a 
railing had not yet been installed on the second 
floor balcony. While painting the interior, Hale 
inadvertently stepped off the second-floor balcony 
and fell to the first floor below, sustaining injuries. 
\ 6 Hale filed a complaint against Beckstead 
alleging negligence, violation of the Occupational 
and Safety Health Act (OSHA), and premises 
liability. Subsequently, Beckstead moved for 
summary judgment. 
f 7 The trial court granted Beckstead's motion and 
entered summary judgment for Beckstead. The trial 
court found that "[Hale] fell while on [Becksteadfs] 
premises as a business visitor or invitee, ... and that 
any danger posed to [Hale] by the condition of [ 
Beckstead's] partially-completed home was open 
and obvious to [Hale]." The trial court thus held 
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that "[Beckstead] had no duty of care toward [ 
Hale]." Hale appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[2][3] % 8 Hale argues the district court erred in 
holding, as a matter of law, that Beckstead owed no 
duty of care to Hale. "Because the determination of 
whether summary judgment is appropriate presents 
a question of law, we accord no deference to the 
trial court's decision and instead review it for 
correctness." DOIT, Inc. v. louche, Ross & Co., 
926 P.2d 835, 841 (Utah 1996). Also, "the issue of 
'whether a "duty" exists is a question of law' which 
we review for correctness." Fishbaugh v. Utah 
Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1998) 
(quoting Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360, 
1363 (Utah 1986)). 
ANALYSIS 
I. Restatement (Second) of Torts and Landowner 
Duty 
K 9 Hale argues the district court erred in holding 
that Beckstead owed no duty of care to protect Hale 
from the danger posed by the *630 unprotected 
balcony. In English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d 153, 156 
(Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court suggested 
that Utah follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
(1965) (the Restatement) with regard to duty in 
cases of landowner liability. In that case, the 
supreme court employed Restatement sections 328E 
, 332, and 343 to define the status of the plaintiff 
workman as a " 'business visitor' " and the 
landowner as a " 'possessor of land.' " English, 848 
P.2d at 156 (quoting the Restatement sections 328E, 
332, 343). The English court then quoted section 
343 of the Restatement in its entirety and provided 
the following analysis: 
Sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement 
impose on a possessor of land the duty to warn an 
invitee about two general types of hazards: (1) 
those that are present on the land when the invitee 
enters which the possessor should expect the 
invitee will not discover or realize, and (2) those 
that the possessor creates after the invitee's 
entry[.] 
English, 848 P.2d at 156 (emphasis added). 
Because the plaintiff invitee in English "created the 
hazard which led to his death," the supreme court 
did not apply sections 343 and 343A in that case. 
Id. However, the English court clearly indicated 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
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that a landowner's duty to an invitee in Utah is set 
out in sections 343 and 343A of the Restatement. 
See id. at 156-57. [FN1] 
FN1. Historically, the Utah Supreme Court 
has applied the common law open and 
obvious danger rule in landowner liability 
cases. See, e.g., Moore v. Burton Lumber 
& Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 868 (Utah 
1981) ("It has long been held that a 
property owner has no obligation to warn 
an invitee of dangers which are known to 
the invitee or which are so obvious and 
apparent that he may reasonably be 
expected to discover them."); Ellertson v. 
Dansie, 576 P.2d 867, 868 (Utah 1978) 
("Where there is a dangerous condition on 
one's property, which is just as observable 
to an invitee as to the owner, the owner has 
no duty to warn or to protect the invitee 
except to observe the universal standard of 
reasonable care under the 
circumstances."). However, in Donahue v. 
Durfee, this court announced the 
abandonment of the open and obvious 
danger rule in Utah. See 780 P.2d 1275, 
1279 (Utah Ct.App.1989), cert, denied, 
789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990). We held that by 
"establishing a comparative negligence 
system, the Utah Legislature has by 
necessary implication abolished the open 
and obvious danger rule as an absolute bar 
to an injured [invitee's] recovery." Id. 
However, we conclude that Donahue has 
since been overruled sub silento by our 
supreme court. See House v. Armour of 
Am., Inc., 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996), affg 
886 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct.App.1994). In 
House, the supreme court granted 
certiorari to review this court's application 
of the law governing duty in a reversal of 
the district court's grant of summary 
judgment for a defendant manufacturer in a 
products liability case. See 929 P.2d at 
342. Defendant argued that "the court of 
appeals erred in failing to find that because 
the hazards [were] open and obvious, 
defendant [ ] did not have a duty to warn" 
or otherwise protect the plaintiff. Id. at 
343. While "agree[ing] with the court of 
appeals' ultimate conclusion that a genuine 
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issue of material fact exist[ed] as to 
whether the relevant danger ... was open 
and obvious," the supreme court felt 
compelled to "clarify" our "suggestion] 
that Utah has 'abandoned' the open and 
obvious danger rule in all circumstances." 
Id. The referenced "suggestion" arose from 
our discussion of, inter alia, Mulherin v. 
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301, 1303 
(Utah 1981) and Donahue, 780 P.2d at 
1279 (Utah Ct.App.1989). See House, 886 
P.2d at 548 (Utah CtApp. 1994). 
The supreme court found persuasive "the 
reasoning of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit," wherein that 
court opined: " 'If a manufacturer had to 
warn consumers against every such 
obvious danger inherent in a product, "the 
list of obvious [dangers] would be so long, 
it would fill a volume." ' " Id. at 344 
(quoting Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
787 F.2d 726, 731 (1st Cir.1986) (quoting 
Plante v. Hobart Corp., Ill F.2d 617, 620 
(1st Cir.1985))). Our supreme court went 
on to "determine whether the danger posed 
to [plaintiff] was open and obvious as a 
matter of law." Id. After applying the open 
and obvious danger rule to the facts before 
it, the supreme court could not "say as a 
matter of law that the [hazard] was open 
and obvious [and] [t]herefore, the court of 
appeals correctly held that there [were] 
material issues of fact sufficient to 
preclude the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment." Id. at 345 (quotations and 
citation omitted); see also Golding v. 
Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co., 902 P.2d 142, 
146 (Utah 1995) ("Under the [Utah 
Limitation of Landowner Liability] Act, a 
landowner's knowledge of a dangerous 
condition that is inherent in the use to 
which the land is put and is common, open, 
and obvious does not give rise to 
liability."); Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow 
Irrigation Co., 813 P.2d 1169, 1173 (Utah 
1991) (refusing to apply the "hidden trap" 
exception to canal owners immunity 
doctrine where "[t]he hazards .... are open 
and obvious, and ... inhere[nt] in the very 
existence of canals and ditches"). 
Hence, we conclude the open and obvious 
danger rule remains viable in Utah law 
governing duty. 
Tf 10 Indeed, in Laws v. Blanding City, our most 
recent case involving an open and obvious *631 
danger in the context of landowner liability, this 
court applied the open and obvious danger analysis 
of the Restatement sections 343 and 343A 
(Restatement approach). See 893 P.2d 1083, 1085 
(Utah Ct.App.1995). In that case we held that 
"[t]he correct statement of the duty Defendant, a 
possessor of land, owed Plaintiff, an invitee, is 
contained in sections 343 and 343A of the 
Restatement." Id. 
[4] U 11 Thus, we conclude the open and obvious 
danger rule, as outlined in sections 343 and 343A of 
the Restatement, is the applicable law in this case. 
[FN2] 
FN2. Beckstead asks us to decide this 
appeal by applying the rules of liability for 
employers of independent contractors as 
outlined in the Restatement section 409, its 
companion sections, and the case of 
Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 979 P.2d 
322, which applies various sections of 
chapter 15 of the Restatement, including 
section 409. See id. at ][ 13. Beckstead's 
reliance on these authorities is misplaced. 
Thompson dealt with issues of the 
"retained control" doctrine and the 
"peculiar risk" and "inherently dangerous 
work" doctrines under the Restatement 
sections 413, 426, and 427, Thompson, 
1999 UT 22 at 1 11, 979 P.2d 322 
(quotations omitted), issues not relevant to 
this appeal. More importantly, Thompson 
contains no analysis with regard to the duty 
owed by a possessor of land to an invitee. 
See id. And while section 409 has some 
applicability with regard to the relationship 
between Beckstead and Hale (where 
Beckstead did not participate in or control 
the manner in which Hale performed the 
painting, such that Beckstead owed Hale 
no duty of care concerning the safety of the 
manner or method of performance Hale 
chose to implement), this analysis is not 
dispositive. As we discuss in detail below, 
Hale was a business visitor, an invitee on 
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Beckstead's land—a status wholly separate 
from any status he may have had as an 
independent contractor, which no one 
disputes. 
A. The Restatement Approach to the Open and 
Obvious Danger Rule 
^112 Section 343 of the Restatement provides: 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for 
physical harm caused to his invitees by a 
condition on the land if, but only if, he 
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care 
would discover the condition, and should realize 
that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to 
such invitees, and 
(b) should expect that they will not discover or 
realize the danger, or will fail to protect 
themselves against it, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect 
them against danger. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343. Hence, 
section 343 "impose[s] on a possessor of land the 
duty to warn an invitee about two general types of 
hazards: (1) those that are present on the land when 
the invitee enters which the possessor should expect 
the invitee will not discover or realize, and (2) those 
that the possessor creates after the invitee's entry." 
English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d 153, 156 (Utah 1993). 
K 13 Section 343 A of the Restatement 
substantially clarifies the duty outlined in section 
343 when the dangerous " 'condition is known to the 
invitee, or is obvious to him.' " Laws v. Blanding 
City, 893 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Utah Ct.App.1995) 
(citation omitted); see also Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 343 cmt. a ("Section [343] should be 
read together with § 343A."). Section 343A(1) of 
the Restatement provides that "[a] possessor of land 
is not liable to his invitees for physical harm caused 
to them by any activity or condition on the land 
whose danger is known or obvious to them [.]" 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343A(1). 
[5] % 14 We agree with the district court that the 
danger in this case—the second-floor balcony, which 
lacked railings because construction at Beckstead's 
house was not yet completed—was "known or 
obvious" to Hale within the meaning of section 
343A of the Restatement. Hale concedes the house 
was only partially constructed and the second-floor 
Page 5 
balcony was unprotected, exposing a drop of over 
six feet. The inherent risk of such a condition in a 
partially-constructed house is "apparent to and 
would be recognized by a reasonable man ... in 
[Hale's position as an experienced painting 
subcontractor] exercising ordinary perception, 
intelligence, and judgment." Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 343A(1) cmt. b. 
B. Restatement Exceptions to the Open and 
Obvious Danger Rule 
U 15 There are, however, significant exceptions to 
the open and obvious danger rule *632 under the 
Restatement which can, in some cases, limit the 
protection the rule affords to landowners. [FN3] 
Section 343A(1) of the Restatement reads: "A 
possessor of land is not liable to his invitee for 
physical harm caused to them by any activity or 
condition on the land whose danger is known or 
obvious to them, unless the possessor should 
anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or 
obviousness." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
343A(1). Comment f states further: 
FN3. The existence of such exceptions 
illustrates that the open and obvious 
danger rule of sections 343 and 343A of 
the Restatement "avoidfs] the rigidity of 
the traditional common-law rule by 
permitting the courts to hold that a 
plaintiffs knowledge of the danger does 
not necessarily absolve the occupier of 
liability, and permitfs] a plaintiff to 
recover if it appears and is found that the 
risk was one which would not be 
anticipated or appreciated by the invitee, 
or where the [landowner] can and should 
anticipate that the dangerous condition will 
cause harm to the invitee notwithstanding 
its known or obvious danger." 62 Am.Jur. 
2D Premises Liability § 157 (1990) 
(footnotes and citations omitted). Hence, 
the Restatement approach to the open and 
obvious danger rule is not necessarily the 
kind of "strict all-or-nothing rule" alluded 
to by our supreme court in House, 929 
P.2dat344. 
There are ... cases in which the possessor of land 
can and should anticipate that the dangerous 
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condition will cause physical harm to the invitee 
notwithstanding its known or obvious danger. In 
such cases the possessor is not relieved of the 
duty of reasonable care which he owes to the 
invitee for his protection.... 
Such reason to expect harm to the visitor from 
known or obvious dangers may arise, for 
example, where the possessor has reason to 
expect that the invitee's attention may be 
distracted, so that he will not discover what is 
obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or 
fail to protect himself against it. Such reason may 
also arise where the possessor has reason to 
expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter 
the known or obvious danger because to a 
reasonable man in his position the advantages of 
doing so would outweigh the apparent risk. 
Id. § 343A(1) cmt. f. 
|^ 16 Accordingly, the dispositive issue before us 
is whether or not Beckstead should have 
anticipated that Hale would suffer injury despite the 
known and obvious danger posed by the 
unprotected balcony, either because Hale's interior 
painting required a deliberate encounter with the 
danger, or because Hale was likely to become 
distracted. 
[6] f 17 With regard to the deliberate encounter 
exception, Laws v. Blanding City, 893 P.2d 1083 
(Utah Ct.App. 1995), is instructive. In Laws, the 
city's invitee was injured after falling from a 
dumping platform at the city's landfill. See id. at 
1084. Following a jury trial the invitee appealed 
the verdict in favor of the city. See id. This court 
reversed the jury verdict and remanded for a new 
trial, holding the district court failed to properly 
instruct the jury regarding the duty owed by the city 
to its invitees notwithstanding the known and 
obvious nature of the hazard posed by the dumping 
platform. See id. at 1085-86 (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §§ 343A(l), 343A(l) cmt. f). 
We noted that because the appellant invitee lived 
outside the city's curbside trash pickup area, he was 
required by city ordinance to dispose of his trash 
himself using the dumping platform at the landfill. 
See id. at 1086. As such, the city "had a duty to 
protect [appellant invitee] because [the city] should 
have known that a reasonable person would, 
recognizing the danger, nevertheless encounter zY." 
Id. at 1086 (emphasis added); see also Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 343A (1) cmt. f. 
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K 18 Unlike the appellant invitee in Laws, Hale 
was under no obligation by city ordinance or 
otherwise to encounter Beckstead's land at all, let 
alone the unprotected balcony from which he fell. 
Instead, Hale voluntarily entered the land to 
perform a freely negotiated painting contract for 
which he had expertise. 
U 19 Case law from other jurisdictions that have 
adopted the Restatement approach under sections 
343 and 343A is instructive and supports our 
approach. In Sutherland v. Barton, a powerful 
electric shock killed a worker at a job-site where 
machinery controls were being upgraded at a paper 
plant. See 570 N.W.2d 1, 2, 4 (Minn. 1997). The 
*633 fatal injury occurred while the worker was 
working on live electrical wiring that he and his 
fellow electricians at the project site knew "could be 
deadly." Id. at 3- 4. There was no dispute at trial 
that "the danger was known and obvious to [the 
decedent worker]." Id. at 7. However, the appellant 
argued that the decedent worker's "only alternative 
to avoiding the risk of the live [wiring] was to forgo 
his employment." Id. The Supreme Court of 
Minnesota reinstated a grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the paper plant, holding that the paper 
plant "did not owe [the decedent worker] a duty to 
protect him from harm by [the] known and obvious 
danger" because: (a) the worker "had expertise as 
an electrician [,] ... the exact reason [for which he 
was] hired"; (b) "[i]t was entirely reasonable for 
[the paper plant] to expect that [the worker] would 
take the necessary safety precautions"; and (c) the 
paper plant "had no reason to anticipate that [the 
worker] would proceed to encounter the danger of 
the live [wires] without taking the necessary safety 
precautions." Id. at 7-8. 
U 20 Likewise, in this case, Hale contracted with 
Beckstead to paint the interior of a 
partially-constructed house containing an 
unprotected second- floor balcony—clearly a known 
or obvious danger. Hale held himself out to 
Beckstead as having expertise to complete the 
job—the very reason for which he was hired. As 
such, Beckstead could reasonably expect that Hale 
"would take the necessary safety precautions" and 
"had no reason to anticipate that [Hale] would 
proceed to encounter the [unprotected balcony] 
without taking the necessary safety precautions." 
[FN4] Id. at 7. Hence, this is not a case where 
Beckstead "ha[d] reason to expect that [Hale 
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would] encounter the known or obvious danger 
because to a reasonable man in his position the 
advantages of doing so would outweigh the 
apparent risk." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 
343A(1) cmt. f. 
FN4. We note that Hale failed to provide 
the trial court with any evidence as to how 
his presence on Beckstead fs land for 
purposes of painting might require a 
deliberate encounter with the unprotected 
balcony. 
[7] H 21 The distraction exception is equally 
inapplicable. In Kotecki v. Walsh Constr. Co., a 
commercial painter hired to paint door frames was 
injured when he lost his footing on a ladder situated 
next to a dock-leveling mechanism at the 
construction site. See 333 Ill.App.3d 583, 267 
Ill.Dec. 402, 776 N.E.2d 774, 776 (Ill.App.Ct.2002) 
The dock leveler was being used to unload 
merchandise into the mostly-completed retail store 
where the appellant painter was working. See id. 
TI 22 At a pre-trial deposition, the appellant 
painter testified he "knew the dock area was being 
used ... to unload merchandise" and that there were 
many other tradesmen in the area. Id. The appellant 
painter conceded that the foregoing conditions 
constituted a known or obvious danger, "but 
claim[ed] that the distraction ... exception[ ] 
appl[ied] to impose liability." Id. at 779. The 
Illinois Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment for the store 
owner. See id. at 775, 780-81. In so holding, the 
Kotecki court noted that the Restatement's 
distraction exception contemplates unusual 
distractions; not merely those conditions and 
activities typical of any construction site. See id. at 
780 ("A distraction-free environment on a 
construction project would be an impossible burden 
to meet." "Imposing a duty to guard against [every] 
distraction [ ] ... on a construction project ignores 
the reality of the construction industry."); cf. 
House v. Armour of Am., Inc., 929 P.2d 340, 344 
(Utah 1996) ("If a manufacturer had to warn 
consumers against every such obvious danger 
inherent in a product, the list of obvious [dangers] 
would be so long, it would fill a volume" 
(quotations and citations omitted.)). 
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^ 23 Here, like the appellant painter in Kotecki, 
Hale would have us apply Restatement section 
343A(1) comment f to impose upon land possessors 
a duty to anticipate and mitigate against ordinary 
distractions which might cause worker invitees 
harm from known and obvious dangers on 
construction sites. [FN5] We refuse to apply such 
an expansive and impractical rule. 
FN5. Hale put no evidence before the trial 
court to indicate that any unusual 
distraction existed in Beckstead's 
unfinished house. Where "there is an 
absence of evidence of the cause of 
plaintiffs injury[, we cannot know] 
whether [Hale] was distracted or merely 
inattentive to an obvious danger." Kotecki 
v. Walsh Constr. Co., 333 IU.App.3d 583, 
267 Ill.Dec. 402, 776 N.E.2d 774, 780 
(2002) (citing Wreglesworth v. Arctco Inc., 
317 Ill.App.3d 628, 251 Ill.Dec. 363, 740 
N.E.2d 444, 454 (2000) (holding the 
distraction exception does not require 
landowners to guard against an invitee's 
inattention to an obvious danger)). 
*634 CONCLUSION 
[8] K 24 Hale contracted with Beckstead to paint 
the interior of Beckstead's house while construction 
was ongoing. Hale stepped off an unprotected 
balcony area that was known and obvious to him. 
Beckstead should not have expected that Hale 
would necessarily encounter the unprotected 
balcony, or that his attention would be distracted 
from it. Accordingly, we hold that Beckstead was 
relieved of any duty to Hale. Hence, we affirm the 
district court's grant of summary judgment. [FN6] 
FN6. Hale also argued the district court 
erred in not allowing consideration of 
violations of OSHA regulations in 
determining liability. However, Hale 
correctly notes that OSHA regulations "do[ 
] not create a [duty] where none existed 
before." See Tollman v. City of Hurricane, 
1999 UT 55,U 4, 985 P.2d 892 (holding 
that OSHA regulations are relevant as to 
breach, but that OSHA regulations do not 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Page 9 of9 
74 P.3d 628 Page 8 
477 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 2003 UT App 240 
(Cite as: 74 P.3d 628) 
create a duty). Because we hold that 
Beckstead owed no duty to Hale, we need 
not reach the issue of whether the district 
court erred in not allowing consideration 
of OSHA violations in this case. 
K 25 I CONCUR: GREGORY K. ORME, Judge. 
THORNE, Judge (dissenting). 
% 26 I respectfully dissent and disagree with the 
majority's assertion that the Utah Supreme Court 
overruled, sub silento, Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 
1275 (Utah Ct.App.1989). See House v. Armour of 
America, Inc., 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996), affg 886 
P.2d 542 (Utah Ct.App.1994); Golding v. Ashley 
Cent. Irrigation Co., 902 P.2d 142, 145-48 (Utah 
1995); Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation Co., 813 
P.2d 1169, 1172-73 (Utah 1991). After reading the 
cases cited by the majority, I believe that the Utah 
Supreme Court's position is, at best, ambiguous 
concerning our holding in Donahue. [FN1] 
Because it is unclear that the cases relied upon by 
the majority do in fact "revive" the open and 
obvious danger rule in landowner liability cases, I 
conclude that this court is bound by the reasoning in 
Donahue. [FN2] 
FN2. In House, 886 P.2d at 548, we 
reaffirmed our pronouncement in Donahue 
v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989), that the open and obvious 
danger rule is inconsistent with a 
comparative negligence system. Laws v. 
Blanding City, 893 P.2d 1083, 1085 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1995), the case extensively relied 
upon by the majority, also cites Donahue 
favorably, but then, inexplicably, appears 
to depart from its principles. Id. at 1286. 
Thus, between Donahue in 1989 and House 
in 1994, we held firm to the idea that the 
open and obvious danger rule is 
inconsistent with a comparative negligence 
system. 
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, once a point 
of law is decided, that ruling should be followed 
by a court of the same or a lower rank in 
subsequent cases confronting the same legal 
issue. Once the court of last resort makes a legal 
ruling, decisions on the same issue by courts of a 
lower rank are superseded. 
State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 
1995) (citations and quotations omitted). 
"Although the doctrine is typically thought of when 
a single-panel appellate court is faced with a prior 
decision from the same court, stare decisis has equal 
application when one panel of a multi-panel 
appellate court is faced with a prior decision of a 
different panel." State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1269 (Utah 1993). 
H 27 Until the Utah Supreme Court overrules 
Donahue or establishes a precedent at odds with 
Donahue, we are bound to follow our 
pronouncement in Donahue that the open and 
obvious dangers rule is incompatible with a 
comparative negligence system. *635 Accordingly, 
I would reverse the trial court decision and remand 
for proceedings consistent with Donahue. 
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FN1. For example, House v. Armour of 
America, Inc., 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996), 
affg 886 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct.App.1994), 
deals specifically with the notion of 
product liability. See id. at 342-43. 
Golding v. Ashley Central Irrigation Co., 
902 P.2d 142 (Utah 1995), addresses 
liability under the Landowner Liability Act 
and Pratt v. Mitchell Hollow Irrigation 
Co., 813 P.2d 1169 (Utah 1991), addresses 
liability to trespassers and the attractive 
nuisance doctrine. See also Golding, 902 
P.2d at 148; Pratt, 813 P.2d at 1173. I 
believe these arenas of the law are 
sufficiently different from the facts at issue 
here that it is unwise to conclude that the 
standards articulated therein necessarily 
apply to this factual situation. 
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